A market design approach for workers' selection of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico

Authors

  • David Cantala El Colegio de México
  • Jaume Sempere El Colegio de México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v30i1.23

Keywords:

matching, mechanism design

Abstract

In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure.

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References

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Published

2015-01-01

How to Cite

Cantala, D., & Sempere, J. (2015). A market design approach for workers’ selection of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 30(1), 75–92. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v30i1.23

Issue

59-vol. 30 no. 1, january-june, 2015

Section

Articles