59-vol. 30 no. 1, january-june, 2015
Articles

A market design approach for workers' selection of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico

pdf

PDF (Español)
pdf

XML (Español)
  • David Cantala,
  • Jaume Sempere
David Cantala
El Colegio de México
Jaume Sempere
El Colegio de México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v30i1.23

Published 2015-01-01

Keywords

  • matching,
  • mechanism design

How to Cite

Cantala, D., & Sempere, J. (2015). A market design approach for workers’ selection of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 30(1), 75–92. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v30i1.23

Metrics

Abstract

In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure.

pdf

PDF (Español)
pdf

XML (Español)

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

  1. Abdulkadiroglu A. y T. Sönmez. 2003. School choice: A mechanism design approach, American Economic Review, 93(3): 729-747.
  2. Dubbins L. E. y D. A. Freedman. 1981. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shaply algorithm, American Mathematical Monthly, 88: 485-494.
  3. Dur U. M. y O. Kesten. 2014. Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications, Boston College, mimeo.
  4. Ergin, H. 2002. Efficient resource a location on the basis of priorities, Econometrica, 70(6): 2489-2497.
  5. Gale, D. y L. Shapley. 1962. College admission and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9-15.
  6. INE. 2010. Estatuto del servicio profesional electoral y del personal del Instituto Federal Electoral, DOF, núm., 48, segunda sección, 15/01/2010.
  7. INE. 2013. Lineamientos del concurso publico 2013-2014 para ocupar cargos y puestos del servicio profesional electoral del Instituto Federal Electoral como medida especial de carácter temporal.<http://norma.ife.org.mx/documents/27912/272231/2013LINDELCONPUB20132014.pdf/7fe9d90e-bb35-41ad-8cb781040e1bfdc1> .
  8. Knuth, D.E. 1976. Mariages stables, Montreal, Les Presses de l’Universite de Montreal.
  9. Pereyra, J.S. 2013. A dynamic school choice model, Games and Economic Behavior, 80(C): 100-114.
  10. Roth A. E. y E. Parenson. 1999. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engeneering aspects of economic design, American Economic Review, 89: 748-780.
  11. Roth A. E. y M. Sotomayor. 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game- Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.