Vol. 40 No. 1 (2025): 79-vol. 40, núm. 1, enero-junio 2025
Articles

Treating equals equally and unequals unequally in one-sided matching markets

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  • David Cantala,
  • Saul Mendoza-Palacios
David Cantala
El Colegio de México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v40i1.e461

Published 2025-03-26

Keywords

  • one-sided matching,
  • optimal transportation theory,
  • Pareto optimality,
  • core

How to Cite

Cantala, D., & Mendoza-Palacios, S. (2025). Treating equals equally and unequals unequally in one-sided matching markets. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 40(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v40i1.e461

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Abstract

We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optimal transportation theory, to find a TEEUU assignment in the core whenever it exists- by searching a Pareto optimal assignment- and 2) conditions under which a TEEUU assignment in the core always exists.

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