Privatization: Do prices rise or fall? Mixed duopoly with vertical differentiation
Abstract
In this paper, we use a duopoly model with vertical (quality) product differentiation to determine whether privatization of a public firm leads to higher or lower prices than those prevailing in a mixed duopoly. We show that privatization can move prices on either direction.
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