Artículos
La estructura del poder político y la redistribución en economías con múltiples gobiernos
Publicado 2015-07-01
Palabras clave
- redistribución,
- eficiencia,
- federalismo,
- elecciones
Cómo citar
Ponce Rodríguez, R. A., Kochi, I., & Gutiérrez Casas, L. E. (2015). La estructura del poder político y la redistribución en economías con múltiples gobiernos. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 30(2), 269–303. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v30i2.29
Resumen
Para economías con múltiples gobiernos, el esfuerzo y efectividad de la redistribución pública depende de la estructura política de la federación. El gobierno central determina el grado de redistribución pública; las preferencias y el salario de los votantes que controlan, respectivamente, al gobierno central y gobiernos sub-nacionales determinan si la redistribución del ingreso es efectiva en redistribuir el bienestar. En este artículo identificamos condiciones en las que la interacción entre el gobierno central y gobiernos sub-nacionales conduce a una asignación Pareto superior en la redistribución del ingreso.
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Citas
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