Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy

  • Ikuho Kochi Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
  • Raúl . A Ponce Rodríguez Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
Keywords: inter-governmental transfers, size of government, electoral competition
JEL Classification: H77, H41, H50


In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers. ii) The central government has political incentives to produce differentiated and uniform local public goods. Moreover, we provide a comparative analysis to study the influence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional spillovers of local public goods, and the distribution of the population in the economy on the size and distribution of local public spending.


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How to Cite
KochiI., & Ponce RodríguezR. . (2011). Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy. Estudios Económicos, 26(1), 123-149.
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