70-vol. 35, no. 2, july-december, 2020
Articles

Saturation levels of mobile telecommunications markets and optimal termination rates

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  • Daniel Ventosa-Santaulària,
  • Alexander Elbittar,
  • Pedro Matías,
  • Carlos Aguilar Huerta
Daniel Ventosa-Santaulària
Banco de México/CIDE
Alexander Elbittar
CIDE
Pedro Matías
CIDE
Carlos Aguilar Huerta
CIDE
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v35i2.406

Published 2020-07-01

Keywords

  • mobile markets and diffusion,
  • saturation levels,
  • mobile termination rate

How to Cite

Ventosa-Santaulària, D., Elbittar, A., Matías, P., & Aguilar Huerta, C. (2020). Saturation levels of mobile telecommunications markets and optimal termination rates. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 35(2), 331–355. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v35i2.406

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the how the two main mobile telecommunication payment regimes, receiving party pays (RPP) and calling party pays (CPP), impact mobile telecommunication diffusion patterns; and provides evidence that a quadratic and concave relationship exists between mobile termination rate and the level of penetration of mobile telecommunications. We also find significant evidence that competition, political regime and internet use affect the saturation rate as well. Finally, we find that the global behavior of telecommunication markets has contributed to a reduction in the gap between the optimal and actual mobile termination rates in most countries.

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