Compliance in contributions payment: Fiscal authorities versus religious authorities in Mexico

  • Luis Augusto Chávez Maza CEDES / Benemérita Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Puebla
  • Alexander Elbittar Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas
  • Fausto Hernández Trillo Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas y Kellogg Institute for International Studies
JEL Classification: H20, H31, H44


This paper studies fiscal correspondence and fiscal trust. Through an experimental design carried out in Oaxaca, Mexico it explores which authority, the religious or the civil one, is better at collecting contributions to finance common goods. Results suggest that fiscal correspondence is the main factor to explain better collection. That is, when the good is observable, people are more willing to pay the contribution.


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How to Cite
Chávez MazaL., ElbittarA., & Hernández TrilloF. (2015). Compliance in contributions payment: Fiscal authorities versus religious authorities in Mexico. Estudios Económicos, 30(1), 51-74.
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