Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation

  • Andrés Cendales Universidad Católica de Colombia
  • Jhon James Mora Universidad ICESI
Keywords: clientelism, poverty, political negotiation, precarious democracies
JEL Classification: C72, D31, D33, D63

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government.

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Published
01-07-2015
How to Cite
Cendales, A., & James Mora, J. (2015). Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation. Estudios Económicos, 30(2), 305-339. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v30i2.30