Technology choice between the principal and the agent in an evolutionary context

  • Jhon James Mora Universidad del Valle
Keywords: technology, evolutionary interactive context, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, ESS

Abstract

This paper discusses the necessary conditions for principal and agent contract in an evolutionary interactive context and how a specific technology prevails. The resulting stability condition is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, ESS, in the Maynard Smith tradition. When productivity is greater or equal to one arises a ESS in a particular technology and when productivity is less than one the only way to explain why a particular technology prevails is by means of a convention.

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Published
01-07-1998
How to Cite
James MoraJ. (1998). Technology choice between the principal and the agent in an evolutionary context. Estudios Económicos, 13(2), 225-247. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v13i2.232
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