66-vol. 33, núm. 2, julio-diciembre, 2018
Artículos

Contribuciones de campaña y bienes públicos locales en una federación

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  • Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v33i2.360

Publicado 2018-07-01

Palabras clave

  • bienes públicos locales,
  • eficiencia,
  • externalidades,
  • federalismo,
  • elecciones y contribuciones de campaña

Cómo citar

Ponce Rodríguez, R. A. (2018). Contribuciones de campaña y bienes públicos locales en una federación. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 33(2), 283–311. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v33i2.360

Métrica

Resumen

Se desarrolla un modelo de economía política para estudiar la provisión descentralizada de bienes públicos locales (BPLs). Se compara una economía con y sin contribuciones de campaña de los votantes: en la primera economía, los gobiernos locales proveen BPLs que no son Pareto eficientes y no maximizan las ganancias atribuibles a diferenciar los BPLs de acuerdo con la heterogeneidad inter-regional de preferencias de los votantes. Para una economía con contribuciones de campaña, los BPLs, con y sin externalidades, son Pareto eficientes y los gobiernos locales maximizan las ganancias atribuibles a diferenciar la provisión de BPLs de acuerdo con la heterogeneidad inter-regional de preferencias.

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