15-vol. 8, no. 1, january-june, 1993
Articles

The politics of intergovernmental transfers and local government deficits: Theory and evidence

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  • Pablo J. Sanguinetti
Pablo J. Sanguinetti
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v8i1.291

Published 1993-01-01

Keywords

  • fiscal policy,
  • coordination failure,
  • Argentina,
  • Great Britain

How to Cite

Sanguinetti, P. J. (1993). The politics of intergovernmental transfers and local government deficits: Theory and evidence. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 8(1), 87–109. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v8i1.291

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we present a model of decentralized fiscal policy making where a "coordination failure" problem arises. Second, we make an effort in order to empirically test this approach by developing an empirical investigation based on the recent experience of two countries: Argentina and Great Britain.

 

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