20-vol. 10, no. 2, july-december, 1995
Articles

The debt relief theory

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  • Jorge Fernández
Jorge Fernández
El Colegio de México
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v10i2.266

Published 1995-07-01

Keywords

  • economic crisis,
  • external debt,
  • developing countries,
  • bargaining models

How to Cite

Fernández, J. (1995). The debt relief theory. Estudios Económicos De El Colegio De México, 10(2), 163–193. https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v10i2.266

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Abstract

The LDC debt crisis has spurred a series of models which allow for the analysis of relief proposals. This paper studies some aspects of these models. Debt-buybacks, debt-equity swaps and the case for pure debt forgiveness are reviewed. Some bargaining models are also analyzed.

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References

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