TY - JOUR AU - Cendales, Andrés AU - James Mora, Jhon PY - 2015/07/01 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation JF - Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México JA - EE VL - 30 IS - 2 SE - Articles DO - 10.24201/ee.v30i2.30 UR - https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/30 SP - 305-339 AB - <p>This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government.</p> ER -