TY - JOUR AU - Kochi, Ikuho AU - Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl . A PY - 2011/01/01 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy JF - Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México JA - EE VL - 26 IS - 1 SE - Articles DO - 10.24201/ee.v26i1.102 UR - https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/102 SP - 123-149 AB - <p>In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers. ii) The central government has political incentives to produce differentiated and uniform local public goods. Moreover, we provide a comparative analysis to study the influence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional spillovers of local public goods, and the distribution of the population in the economy on the size and distribution of local public spending.</p> ER -