@article{Medrano_1999, title={Tariff protection and trade agreements}, volume={14}, url={https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/224}, DOI={10.24201/ee.v14i2.224}, abstractNote={<p>This paper studies the optimal tariff rates on goods imported from the rest of the world when a commercial club accepts a new partner. It shows that when a new member is accepted into the club, the other members of a free trade agreement have incentives to reduce tariffs on the rest of the world’s goods. However, when the trade agreement is a custom union, the union may have incentives to increase the common external tariff. This happens when the industry of the custom union is small compared to the world industry.</p>}, number={2}, journal={Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México}, author={Medrano, Leonardo}, year={1999}, month={Jul.}, pages={217–229} }